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THE STRAW MAN OF LEGAL POSITIVISM
Thomas Broden, Jr.*
In 1951, a distinguished U.S. Court of Appeals Judge said:
John Austin, the patron saint of the modem positivists, began
the law's descent to the Avernus of unfaith by proposing to distin-
guish morals from law. Some of the modern but less moderate prag-
matists have continued it by proposing to divorce morals from law,
while the down-right radicals among them, including the fellow
travelers, preferring headlong descent, propose, as Nietzsche did, to
abolish morals altogether.'
Two years ago a respected political scientist wrote,
recently jurisprudence has been befuddled by a school, lately fashion-
able in America, which, in the last resort, as Mr. Justice Holmes
cynically pointed out, reduces the bases of law to the question, "who
can kill whom?" 2
In 1949 an editorial in the American Bar Association Journal opined
that,
our difficulties have been increased by the fact that at this critical
period many of our statesmen, judges, and particularly our law teachers,
had abandoned natural law and had become champions of positivism
or what some termed legal realism .... They maintain that the stand-
ards and ideals of natural law are matters for ethics and moral
philosophies and have no place in the administration of the positive
law.3
These quotations condemning a so-called school of jurisprudence
generally known as legal positivism 4 illustrate the typical view of many
lawyers, philosophers, theologians and other thoughtful persons. According
to this typical view legal positivism is a well developed philosophy of law the
main tenets of which are that might makes right and that law and state
sovereignty are absolute and not subject to independent moral evaluation.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 Hutcheson, The Natural Law & The Rights to Property, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 640,651 (1951).
2 Catlin, Political Theory, 72 POL. SCL Q. 1,21 (1957).
3 35 A.B.AJ. 42 (1949).
4 Sometimes referred to as analytical jurisprudence or legal realism.
5 Professor Bernard Schwartz has said, " 'With the goodness or the badness of laws,' dog-
matically declaimed Austin in a famous passage, jurisprudence 'has no immediate concern.'
Schwartz, Administrative Procedure and Natural Law, 28 NoTmE DAME LAW. 169,170 (1953).
Father Francis E. Lucey, S.J. has written that the analytical school "makes law stand on its own
feet, absolutely divorces law and moral as to the formal element of a moral ought, makes the
individual live and behave by privilege not right, deprives man of all innate dignity, and thus
reduces him to the status of an animal." Lucey, Natural Law and Legal Realism, 30 GEo. L.J. 493,
496 (1942).
A leader of the American bar has written: "Law to Holmes as to the jurists of the Roman
Empire and to Austin was the sovereign's command. .... The fact that Holmes was a polished
gentleman who did not go about like a storm trooper knocking people down and proclaiming the
supremacy of the blond beast should not blind us to his legal philosophy that might makes right,
that law is the command of the dominant social group." Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes & Hitler, 31
A.B.A.J. 569, 571 (1937). He continues: "for surely this is Hobbes & Leviathan come to life....
The doctrines of Hobbes, materialist, behaviorist, like Holmes were flagrantly contradictory to those
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Needles' to say this assumed jurisprudential view is roundly indicted, deplored
and declaimed against with vigor and venom. We are warned that legal
positivists are insidious termites threatening the very foundation of our law,
order, freedom and way of life.
It is the burden of this article to demonstrate that these "insidious
termites" of legal positivism are straw men, that is, figments of the imagination
of the righteous attackers. That, as common sense would suggest, no thought-
ful person adheres to a philosophy that might makes right and law is power
alone,- beyond moral limitation. Yet much energy - physical and mental -
is constantly expended in an effort to destroy the assumed positivist dragon.
The most prominent persons in the positivist camp, according to the
typical view, are Thomas Hobbes, a 17th century political writer in England;
John Austin, English lawyer and the first lecturer in Jurisprudence at the
University of London; Jeremy Bentham a late 18th and early 19th century
English writer; Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. of the U.S. Supreme Court;
John Chipman Gray, a late 19th and early 20th century professor of law at
Harvard; and Dr. Hans Kelsen, the most famous living exponent of legal
positivism, who has been a professor of law in Austria and the U.S. There are
lesser luminaries or villains (depending upon your point of view) in the
positivist camp but an examination of the teachings of the leaders will suffice
for our purposes. Since this article challenges the prevailing view of what
these men said, it is necessary to quote their writings extensively. For this I
apologize. However, since what they said and meant is the thing at issue, I
see no other way to fairly discuss it.
JOHN AUSTIN
Although he chronologically follows Hobbes and Bentham, John Austin
will first be studied because he is generally recognized as the dominant figure
in legal positivism, or, as it is often called, "Austinian Positivism."
In 1826 the University of London was established and John Austin was
chosen to teach Jurisprudence. The lectures he gave while teaching at the
University of London formed the basis for this book on Jurisprudence.
Austin's book is not concerned with the technical rules of law employed by
practitioners. He directs his attention to more fundamental and philosophical
legal principles. He does not confine himself to any single body of law.
ideas of Greek and Roman philosophy, of natural law and canon law, of Judaeo-Christian beliefs
in the spiritual reality of man that reached their high fruition in the Declaration, the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. Hobbes was a champion of the totalitarian state.. . . Holmes was directlY
in the tradition of Hobbes." id. at 572.
Father John C. Ford's criticism of Justice Holmes juristic philosophy is well known. "The
essence of law is physical force. Might makes legal right. The law is to be divorced from all morality.
There is no such thing as a moral ought-it is a mere fiction. Ultimately there is only the physical
necessity of behaving or being killed. There is no absolute truth. Man is a cosmic ganglion. His
ideas probably have no more cosmic value than his bowels. He himself has no more cosmic
significance than a baboon or a grain of sand. There is too much fuss about the sanctity of human
life. To the state man is a means to be sacrificed if necessary in the interest of the state. The ultimate
arbiter of all life is physical force. The ultimate ratio decidendi when men disagree is this, Holmes'
words: 'We don't like it and shall kill you if we can.' " Ford, The Fundamentals of Holmes' Juristic
Philosophy, 11 FoPRDHAm L. Rav. 255, reprinted in LEBuFFE & Hyes, THE AsmsicAN Parmosopiy
OF LAw, 377-403 (1947).
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Among others, his material deals with Roman, French and German 'as well
as English Law. He emphasizes the need of precise terminology in the law
and much of his book on Jurisprudence represents an effort to clarify the
meaning of such concepts as positive law, natural law, positive morality, right,
sovereign, sanction, obligation and duty.6
In discussing the concept of positive law, Austin makes clear that for
him this term means the command of the sovereign. From this has been
derived the popular notion of the "Austinian command theory of law" which
has been widely criticized in the belief that it represents a might makes right
position. There is no doubt that Austin defines positive law in terms of
sovereign commands. He says, "Every positive law (or every law simply and
strictly so-called) is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign individual or
body to a member or members of the independent political society wherein its
author is supreme."'7 "Again, a law is a command which obliges a person or
persons." s Equally well known is Austin's proposition that positive law is
different from morality.
For the confusion of them under a common name and the con-
sequent tendency to confound Law and Morals, is one most prolific
source of jargon, darkness and perplexity. By a careful analysis of
leading terms, law is detached from morals, and the attention of the
student of jurisprudence is confined to the distinctions and division
which relate to law exclusively.9
From this it is inferred that Austin believes that law is not subject to moral
evaluation. Finally it is charged that Austin believes in absolute govern-
mental sovereignty. This charge is based upon his position that sovereignty is
incapable of legal limitation.
Now it follows from the essential difference of a positive law, and
from the nature of sovereignty and independent political society, that
the powers of a monarch properly so called, or the power of a sovereign
member in its collegiate and sovereign capacity, is incapable of legal
limitation. (Austin's emphasis.) 10
However, the truth of the matter is that Austin did not hold that might makes
right, did not free law from moral evaluation and did not believe that govern-
mental authority was beyond moral limitation.
A brief explanation of Austin's views demonstrates the utter falsity of
the charges against him. Instead of ignoring or condemning the association
of law and morality, Austin is vitally concerned with strengthening their
relationship. No book on Jurisprudence devotes more time to the relationship
of law and morality and points out more strenuously the fact that positive law
should be judged by God's law and natural law. For example:
Strictly speaking, every law properly so called is a positive law.
For it is put or set by its individual or collective author, or it exists by
the position or institution of its individual or collective author.
6 AUSTIN, THE PRovINcE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 369 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954),
hereinafter cited as AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (Library of Ideas ed.)
7 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 330 (5th ed. 1885).
8 Id. at 96.
9 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 371 (Library of Ideas ed.).
10 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENcE 263 (5th ed., 1885).
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But, as opposed to the law of nature (meaning the law of God),
human law of the first of those capital classes is styled by writers on
jurisprudence 'positive law'. This application of the expression 'positive
law' was manifestly made for the purpose of obviating confusion;
confusion of human law of the first of these capital classes with that
Divine law which is the measure or test of human."1
In discussing Blackstone's statement that human laws are of no validity
if contrary to the laws of God, Austin says:
Now he may mean that all human laws ought to conform to the
Divine laws. If this be his meaning, I assent to it without hesitation.
...Perhaps, again, he means that human lawgivers are themselves
obliged by the Divine laws to fashion the laws which they impose by
that ultimate standard, because, if they do not, God will punish them.
To this also I entirely assent .... 12
Austin found similar confusion of what the law is with what the author
thought the law ought to be in the writings of Paley, Grotius, Puffendorf and
Ulpian.13 These are random samples of the theme which dominates Austin's
consideration of the relationship of God's law and natural law and positive
law.
There is no basis for the charges that Austin separated law and morality.
Very simply, Austin merely made clear that God's law was one thing and
that man's law was another. "The existence of law is one thing; its merit or
demerits another."' 4 One of Austin's purposes was to clarify the distinction
between the two concepts. He felt that a clearer understanding of the relevant
terms would contribute to clarity of legal thinking.
If you read the disquisition in Blackstone on the nature of laws
in general, or the fustian description of law in Hooker's Ecclesiastical
Polity, you will find the same confusion of laws imperative and proper
with laws which are merely such by a glaring perversion of the term.
The cases of this confusion are, indeed, so numerous, that they would
fill a considerable volume. 15
In further discussion of Blackstone's statements that human laws are
not valid if they conflict with God's laws, Austin says:
Now to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law
are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense.
The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed
to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws
by judicial tribunals .... If the laws of God are certain, the motives
which they hold out to disobey any human command which is at
variance with them are paramount to all others. But the laws of God
are not always certain .... What appears pernicious to one person may
appear beneficial to another .... To prove by pertinent reasons that a
law is pernicious is highly useful, because such process may lead to the
abrogation of the pernicious law. To incite the public to resistance ...
may be useful, for resistance grounded on clear and definite prospects
of good, is sometimes beneficial. But to proclaim generally that all
11 Id. at 171.
12 Id. at 215.
13 Id. at 218.
14 Id. at 214.
15 Id. at 211-12.
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laws which are pernicious or contrary to the will of God are void and
not to be tolerated, is to preach anarchy, hostile and perilous as much
to wise and benign rule as to stupid and galling tyranny. 16
His purpose in separately identifying positive law, natural law, positive
morality and Divine law was to clarify the meaning of the terms, not to weaken
or destroy their interrelationship.
What has been said already indicates that there is no basis for the charge
that Austin believed government should be beyond the limitations of morality.
Misconceptions about Austin's views may have arisen from the fact that
Austin attributes to sovereignty the characteristic of power without legal
restraint. But the key word here is legal. He makes perfectly clear that
although the sovereign is not bound by legal restraint he is bound by moral
limitations. Austin's meaning here is simply that, by definition, there exists
in every independent political society an institution which has the authority
to make final human decisions in governmental affairs. This authority Austin
defines as sovereignty. There is certainly nothing unusual about this obser-
vation. For example, in our country, the Supreme Court of the United States
has final authority to decide cases. There is no further legal remedy available
to the parties. We may criticize the court's decision as unwise--even con-
trary to moral principle. But when judicial relief before the Court is ex-
hausted, the legal order has run its course. In this situation, according to
Austin, the court would be sovereign.
There is no justification, however, for inferring from this fact of lack
of further legal restraint that sovereignty is, therefore, subject to no moral
limitations. Nowhere does Austin say so. In fact, on the contrary. In footnote
S, page 268 of the 1885 edition of his book on Jurisprudence, he anticipates
and specifically answers this objection. In that footnote he expressly indicates
that the positive law of the sovereign is subject to morality and the law of God.
Another variation of the charge against Austin in relation to sovereignty
is that under Austinian positivism, the person has no rights except those given
to him by the state and what the state gives it may take away. Further, that
under this philosophy no natural rights are recognized. However, as has
been indicated, when Austin attributes to the sovereign, power to change the
law he is merely indicating the commonplace daily governmental occurrence.
The examples he gives indicate that he means that the sovereign or monarch
may, of course, make any changes in existing laws by amendment or repeal.
However, his examples of what he considers to be unwise changes indicate
his belief that the sovereign is subject to moral limitations. One hypothetical
example he gives is of the British Parliament abolishing the established
church. He says,
Assuming that the church establishment is commanded by the revealed
law, the abolishment would be irreligious: or, assuming that the con-
tinuance of the establishment were commended by general utility, the
abolition, as generally pernicious, would also amount to a sin. But no
man, talking with a meaning, would call a parliamentary abolition of
either or both of the churches an illegal act.' 7
16 Id. at 215-16.
17 Id. at 265.
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But to say that the government is legally free does not mean that the govern-
ment is free from positive morality or the laws of God. "For a government
may be hindered by positive morality from abridging political liberty which it
leaves or grants to its subject: and is bound by the law of God, as known
through the principle of utility, not to load them with legal duties which
general utility condemn.""' Thus Austin expressly indicates that the sovereign
should not violate the moral law or the laws of God and, in addition to this,
expressly indicates his belief that there are rights which individuals have from
sources other than the positive law, to-wit: the laws of God or nature and
from laws which are sanctioned morally.19
Clearly, if we are looking for proponents of what is popularly known as
Austinian Positivism the last man to choose would be John Austin. As has
already been indicated Austin emphasizes the precise meaning of legal ter-
minology in the belief that precision will lead to improvement. He does not
expressly indicate how more precise language will do this. It is possible, how-
ever, that Austin recognized the futility of relying upon automatic application
of natural law principles and the law of God in governmental affairs. He may
well have been concerned to point out the distinction so that it would be
recognized that only through the thoughtful actions of men in legislatures and
the courts will these lofty principles be infused in the positive laws.
THoMAS HOBBES
Let us now examine Thomas Hobbes. Whereas John Austin left no
doubt of his rejection of the might makes right position, Thomas Hobbes is
more pmbiguous. Austin defends Hobbes against this charge,20 and a fair
reading of Hobbes supports Austin. It is true that some passages of Hobbes
could lead one to believe that he freed law of moral evaluation. For example,
Hobbes states that,
Civill law, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth
hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing or other sufficient Sign of the
Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is
to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule.
... Lawes are the Rule of Just, and Unjust; nothing being reputed
Unjust, that is not contrary to some law.21
In a similar vein he states that "before the names of Just and Unjust can take
place, there must be some coercive Power to compell men equally to the
performance of their covenants,.., and such power there is none before the
erection of a Common-wealth. 22
These statements obviously could be interpreted as a might makes right
position.
Hobbes has also made statements from which some might infer that
for him there is no limitation on the power of the sovereign.
... the soveraign is the sole legislator.
18 Id. at 274.
19 Id. at 343.
20 Id. at 268.
21 HOBBYs, LEviATHAN 189 (Cambridge English Classics Ed. 1904.).
22 id. at 97.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The Soveraign ... is not subject to the Civill Lawes. For having
power to make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth free
himself from that subjection .... 23
Seeing then that all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their
Authority, and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth .... 24
These statements obviously suggest unlimited power in the sovereign.
An oft-quoted passage from Hobbes has been implied to indicate the
freedom of law from morality.
To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good
Lawes. But what is a good Law? By a Good law, I mean not a Just
Law; for no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign
Power, and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by
every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man
can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the
Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is In-
justice to none of them. A good Law is that, which is Needful, for the
Good of the People, and with all Perspicuous.25
Finally Hobbes makes observations on property rights which suggest that the
state is the exclusive source of such rights. Hobbes states that property can-
not exist in the absence of sovereign power and the commonwealth.
However, these statements out of context are not an accurate indication
of Hobbes' thoughts. Hobbes was an ardent advocate of the law of nature and
of natural rights. His position was that without government men actually
lived in what he considered a war-like state of nature.2 6 As a practical matter
government is, therefore, necessary for peaceful life,27 but rather than the
sovereign being absolute he clearly states that the sovereign is subject to
God's law and the laws of nature. "It is true, that Soveraigns are all subject
to the Lawes of Nature; because such Lawes be Divine, and cannot by any
man, or Common-wealth be abrogated."2 It was the duty of the sovereign to
put into effect the laws of nature for "the Office of the Soveraign, (be it a
Monarch, or an Assembly) consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted
with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people;
to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account
thereof to God, the Author of that Law and to none but Him." -9 ". . . For in
this consisteth Equity; to which as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a
Soveraign is as much subject as any of the meanest of his People. 3 0
There can be no doubt that Hobbes considered government subject to
God's law and the "Lawes of Nature." 31 It was the moral duty of those
exercising governmental power to act according to these higher laws but,
being the final authority on human law, by definition, the government was
not subject to legal controls. There is nothing startling about this doctrine.
As we have said, in our government we fully recognize that once the Supreme
23 Id. at 190.
24 Id. at 192.
25 Id. at 252.
26 Id. at 81.
27 Id. at 115.
28 Id. at 235.
29 Id. at 242.
30 Id. at 250.
31 Id. at 231.
"LEGAL POSITIVISM"
Court has finally spoken there is no further legal control of the particular
dispute. Rightly or wrongly the positive legal processes have reached the end.
We can assert our disagreement with what the Court has decided but there
is no further legal remedy open to change the Court's decision. The Supreme
Court's decisions condemning racial discrimination in public schools demon-
strate this. To legally change these decisions would require a change in our
basic governmental charter, the Constitution. To refuse to obey these decisions
is clearly civil disobedience. Widespread and wholesale disobedience would
signal the end of civilized community life.
This is what Hobbes is saying. It is his position that life under govern-
ment is to be preferred to anarchy.32 When we look upon the international
scene today his views seem hard to refute. Can anyone doubt that without
government men live in a condition of hostility and war? Furthermore, he
lived and wrote during the revolutionary 1640's and 1650's. It was a time of
Civil War in England. It was a time of military coups and royal executions.
It was a lawless time, a time of war. Hobbes did not glory in its violence and
yearned for the peace and stability of lawful life.33
His main purpose in writing was to present the advantages of lawful
rather than lawless life. But he did not avoid the hard questions. Two of
these are worth examining in some detail. Should men obey a law which is
contrary to God's law? Should governmental authority be strengthened or
weakened? Hobbes faced the first question but his answer is not clear. It
will be remembered that Hobbes considered government bound by God's
law and the natural law so that human laws should not conflict therewith.
However it is not clear what Hobbes suggested in these instances when human
law conflicted with God's law. In two places he says that since the Sovereign
is created by the people, even when the Sovereign actions are contrary to the
law of nature the people cannot be heard to complain "because they have
authorised all his actions, and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them
their own."34
Yet in another place, clearly facing up to the question, Hobbes takes a
somewhat different position.
The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in
Christian Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty,
not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man,
then when their Commandments are one contrary to the other. It is
manifest enough, that when a man ieceiveth two contrary Commands,
and knows than one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not
the other, though it be the command even of his lawfull Soveraign
(whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly,) or the command of his
Father. The difficulty therefore consisteth in this; that men when they
are commanded in the name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether
the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth, doe but
abuse Gods name for some private ends of his own.3 5
32 Id. at 128.
33 Id. at 146.
34 Id. at 177, 234.
35 Id. at 432.
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Lest we hasten too readily to condemn Hobbes for leaving this question
somewhat aloft, we should reflect that even today, 300 years later, we have
not yet worked out the answer to the delicate problem of individual, con-
scientious disobedience to human law.
As to the second question Hobbes makes his position perfectly clear.
Government to be effective must be strong. Although he condemns political
abuses such as governmental favoritism of special interests36 and the "cult of
personality,"' 37 he clearly considers the greatest evils to be those which weaken
governmental power. He condemns military weakness; 3 civil disobedience on
ground of conscience;8 9 lack of legal immunity of government; 40 absolute
private property (no taxing power) 41 and the doctrine of the separation of
powers. 42 Hobbes opposed rebellion,43 was anti-democratic, and favored the
monarchy. He adopted these positions, however, not because of a philosophi-
cal commitment to the doctrine that might makes right or the Divine right of
kings or absolute governmental power but because he thought the institution
of the monarchy was the most practical way to bring about the good life under
God's law, the law of nature. One may agree or disagree with these practical,
prudential judgments of Hobbes, but there is no basis for implying from them
that Hobbes placed the State and law beyond moral evaluation. 44
JEREMY BENTHAM
I think we should deal quite summarily with the next individual, Jeremy
Bentham, a late 18th and early 19th century English writer on politics and
morals. Bentham's entire life and works were so obviously given to the
moral reform of English politics and law as to make further defense by me
almost unnecessary. However, I shall point out two aspects of Bentham's
thought that are particularly relevant to our discussion.
Like most who are called positivists, Bentham condemned the ambiguous
use of moral and legal terminology because of the attendant confusion. He
singled out the concept of natural rights as being a particularly confounding
one.45 Bentham reserved the word "rights" for that which was guaranteed by
"real law." He used the words human inclinations when referring to what
many called "natural rights." To use the same word for both of these con-
cepts he said is confusing. There is no doubt that, for the sake of clarity, he
distinguished positive law from God's law. But instead of being concerned
about freeing positive law from the moral law, Bentham's writings were
36 Id. at 241.
37 Ibid.
38 Id. at 232.
39 Id. at 234.
40 Ibid.
41 Id. at 235.
42 Id. at 236.
43 Ibid.
44 In his introduction to the Appleton-Century Philosophy Source-Book Edition of Hobbes'
DeCive, or, THE CrrszEN (New York 1949) Professor Sterling P. Lamprecht describes the flood of
confused and mistaken criticism that has engulfed and practically inundated what Hobbes really
said and meant.
45 BaNTHAm, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 84 (Ogden ed. 1950).
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largely directed to bringing about their closer relationship. This was to be
done through the application to governmental problems of the moral principle
of utility.
Bentham certainly did not favor absolute and unlimited governmental
power. His writings were largely designed to and did inspire intelligent changes
in the law. His book on the Principles of Legislation identified basic principles
of desirable Civil and Penal Codes. There is no doubt he did not consider law
its own justification. He said, "The general object which all laws have, in
common, is to augment the total happiness of the community .... -46
While recognizing that laws ought to conform to his standard of moral
evaluation, he condemned Blackstone's flat statement that we are bound to
disobey all human laws which are contrary to the natural and divine law. 47
Bentham considered such a statement sheer nonsense. He said, ".... I see no
remedy but that the natural tendency of such doctrine is to impel a man, by
the force of conscience, to rise up in arms against any law whatever that he
happens not to like."' 48 Bentham agreed that under certain circumstances
civil disobedience was proper, nay, even a duty49 but only when the total
circumstances were examined and greater good would result from such
resistance. This is similar to the position taken by that well known legal
positivist, St. Thomas Aquinas, who says that laws clearly contrary to God's
law must not be obeyed but that in more doubtful cases they should be obeyed
to avoid "scandal and disturbance." 50
Clearly Bentham is not guilty of the popular charges leveled against
legal positivism.
JUSTICE HOLMES
This brings us to one of the most fascinating and controversial men in
American law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Son of a famous writer,
a Civil War veteran, Justice of the highest Court of Massachusetts and of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Holmes had a piercing mind and a
captivating pen. Master of the cryptic comment, he has been widely quoted
and vastly misunderstood. As with all great men, he defies labelling and
pigeon-holing. But nevertheless he has been embraced by devotees of various
philosophical positions and condemned for imputed affiliation with various,
often conflicting, social and political ideologies.
He is often accused of membership in or affiliation with the positivist
camp. He is accused of having a philosophy that might makes right, that
law is unrelated to moral principles and that the state possesses unlimited
power.5' Statements relied upon to establish these allegations are as follows:
When the Germans in the late war disregarded what we called the
rules of the game, I don't see there was anything to be said except: we
don't like it and shall kill you if we can. So when it comes to the
46 BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170 (Oxford ed. 1907).
47 BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 213 (1951).
48 Id. at 214.
40 Id. at 215.
50 SuMMA THEOL. I-11, Q. 96, Art. 4.
51 31 A.BAJ. 569 (1945); see note 5 supra.
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development of a corpus juris the ultimate question is what do the
dominant forces of the community want and do they want it hard
enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may stand in the way.52
Law is "a statement of the circumstances in which the public
force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts."5 3
You will find some text writers telling you [that the law] is some-
thing different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or
England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from
principles of ethics or admitted axioms or whatnot, which may or may
not coincide with the decisions .... The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law. 54
These excerpts from Holmes' writings suggest a rather callous view of
law as power alone. The first two statements, the first referring to the Germans
in World War I and the second referring to the law as an aspect of public
force are from letters to Dr. John C. H. Wu, a law professor from China who
became a friend of Holmes while visiting in the United States.
The first of these is a not untypical example of Holmesian literary
brutality. Many believe these portray the true Holmes. I doubt it. I think
most were for literary effect. Later we shall see that these brutal statements
are frequently inconsistent with other eloquent passages by Holmes on the
relation of law to higher values, statements made on more serious occasions.
While it is true one may be more candid in private correspondence than in
public utterances, it is also true that one may be more careless.
Tracking down and clarifying statements of Holmes taken out of context
is not an easy task. But it can be rewarding. For example in the letter to Wu,
it is entirely possible that his apparently callous view about the basis of our
motivation against the Germans in World War I was designed to shock Wu
and thereby awaken him to the "facts of life." This possibility suggests itself
because Holmes' statement was in response to a letter from Wu in which Wu
had called attention to an edition of Stammler's book, The Theory of Justice,
to which Wu had written an appendix. 55 Holmes did not like Stammler's
book because it seemed to him "to elaborate the obvious in scholastic
language" or maintain propositions that he did not believe.56 With his typical
disgust of meaningless general propositions in the law that ambiguously con-
fused law and morals, Holmes let his literary dagger fly. The language is
brutal but I think it is so primarily for effect.
The second statement is an oft-quoted definition by Holmes that law is
"a statement of the circumstances in which the public forces will be brought
to bear upon men through the courts." When read in context it is obviously
intended to refer only to positive law and does not imply approval of un-
limited governmental power. The statement was earlier made in the case of
American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company.57 In that case the
52 Letter to Dr. Wu, Shriver Collection 186-187 (1936).
53 Letter to Dr. Wu, Shriver Collection 157 (1936).
54 Holmes, The Path of the Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 172 (1921).
55 Modem Legal Philosophy Series.
56 SRIVmER, JUsTcE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 186 (1936).
57 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
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plaintiff brought an action for treble damages under the Sherman Act based
on the defendant's activity in monopolizing the fruit business in Central
America. Holmes says that the Sherman Act like almost all statutes does not
apply extra-territorially. It was in this context-purely an analysis of the
purview of positive law - that Holmes made this statement. That he was
using law in this limited sense is made clear by a letter he wrote to Dr. Wu on
December 2, 1922, in which he pointed out that those who have objected to
that definition of law "use the word law in some different sense from that in
which I use it."5 s
The third statement by Holmes defining law as prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact is from a famous address dealing with the study of law
in law schools. It was entitled "The Path of the Law." 9 In this lecture he
makes perfectly clear that he thought much confusion in the study of law
resulted from a failure to distinguish law and morals. Since this is an extremely
important point I beg your indulgence of a rather long quotation.
The first things for a business-like understanding of the matter is
to understand its limits, and therefore I think it desirable at once to
point out and dispel a confusion between morality and law, which some-
times rises to the height of conscious theory, and more often and
indeed constantly is making trouble in detail without reaching the
point of consciousness. You can see very plainly that a bad man has
as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with
the public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance
of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares nothing
for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is
likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay
money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can."
I take it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret
what I have to say as the language of cynicism. The law is the witness
and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the
moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular
jests, tends to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize
the difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a single
end, that of learning and understanding the law. For that purpose you
must definitely master its specific marks, and it is for that I ask you for
the moment to imagine yourselves indifferent to other and greater
things.60
And Holmes then went on to say:
I do not say that there is not a wider point of view from which
the distinction between law and morals becomes of secondary or no
importance.,... But I do say that that distinction is of first importance
for the object which we are here to consider, the right to study and
mastery of the law as a business with well understood limits.6 '
This is hardly the shocking language of the letter to Dr. Wu.
Nor are the following statements of Holmes which were made on other
occasions:
U8 Letter to Dr. Wu, Shriver Collection 158 (1936).
59 Holmes, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167-202 (1921).
60 Holmes, The Path of the Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 169-170 (1921).
61 Id. at 170-171
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If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology, the
science of man, to political economy, to the theory of legislation, ethics,
and thus by several paths to your final view of life. 62
[Law is] A special branch of human knowledge, a branch, I may
add, which is more immediately connected with all the highest interests
of man than any other which deals with practical affairs. 63
A system of law at any time is the result of their present needs
and present notions of what is wise and right on the one hand, and,
on the other, of rules handed down from earlier states of society and
embodying needs and notions which more or less have passed away.64
While Holmes was interested in dispelling confusion because of am-
biguous use of legal and moral terminology, he was well aware that value
judgments played a vital part in development of the law.
"Behind the logical form [of a judicial decision] lies a judgment as to
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root
and nerve of the whole proceeding."'6 5 He added that the judges are not aware
enough of this.66 If they were they wouldn't be so confident about debatable
judgments. He thought the moneyed classes, "who no longer hope to control
the legislatures" now look to the courts to develop new constitutional theories
to preserve 50 year old economic doctrines.6 7 His dissent in Lochner v.
New York6 s clearly indicates his disagreement with these new constitutional
theories. The majority of the court held a minimum wage statute uncon-
stitutional. But Holmes said:
the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics. . . .A Constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory whether of paternalism and the organic relationship
of the citizen to the state or laissez faire .... Every opinion tends to
become a law. I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of
a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law. (Emphasis added.) 69
Whereas in legislation regulating economic affairs, Holmes was prone
to sustain the legislature; in governmental action impinging on civil liberties
Holmes was more definitely an activist judge. He led the way in more careful*
judicial scrutiny of our treatment of aliens. 70 He established the basic
"clear and present danger" test for freedom of speech and the press7 and
would have gone much further than others on the Court in invalidating state
statutes in the field. 72 He struck down state statutes designed to prevent
62 Holmes, The Profession of the Law in COLLECTED LEa.L PAPERS, 30 (1921).
63 Ibid.
64 Holmes, The Bar As A Profession in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 156 (1921).
65 Holmes, The Path of the Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 181 (1921).
66 Id. at 184.
67 Ibid.
68 198 U.S. 45-74, (1905).
69 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905).
70 Chin Yun v. U.S., 208 U.S. 8 (1908); Gegio v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915).
71 Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
72 Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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negroes from voting.73 He also set aside state trials which provided the
form but not the substance of justice to negroes. 74
This is not to say that he always sustained civil liberties arguments.
On the contrary he received criticism for upholding a state sterilization law,7 5
for dissenting in a case striking down an Alabama statute imposing peonage7 ,
and for refusing to set aside the execution sentences of Sacco and Vanzetti.77
But on balance he was more solicitous for civil liberties than other members
of the Court and certainly did not evidence a might makes right philosophy
in his judicial activity.
But Holmes was a skeptic. There is no doubt of this. He had what he
called his own "can't helps."78 These were propositions on which "my fellow
man to a greater or less extent, (never wholly)" are in agreement. But he
denied that "the ultimates of a little creature on this little earth are the least
word of the unimaginable whole. '7 9 While rejecting man's ability to gain
certitude, he recognized that one's attitude on these matters toward the
universe was closely connected v'ith one's evaluation of the wisdom and
propriety of particular actions.80
Holmes has been condemned for his skepticism by believers in natural
law. This is understandable. The basic tenet of any natural law position is
that there are some aspects of human nature which are fixed and immutable.
Holmes denies this. Holmes has been praised for his skepticism by those who
share his doubts. On this point I disagree with Holmes but do not agree with
his detractors who say that one who has no fixed and immutable principles has
a philosophy of law as dangerous as Hitler's. It is not true to say that a denial
of man's ability to grasp immutable principles necessarily results in the
adoption of a totalitarian or otherwise vicious philosophy of law. Principles
that some philosophers believe will affect a person's actions are the kind of
things that Holmes called "can't helps." If these are good then one has a good
philosophy of law. If these are good, as a matter of fact, one has a better
philosophy of law than one who proclaims the superiority of the Aryan race
as a fixed, immutable principle of human nature.
It is evident that Holmes pointed out the distinction between morality
and law. It is clear that he considered positive law to be the command of
sovereign. There is grave doubt however, that he believed that might makes
right, that morality had nothing to do with law and that the will of the state
was beyond moral evaluation.
JoHN CHIPMAN GRAY
John Chipman Gray was a distinguished member of the faculty of the
Harvard Law School around the turn of the century and author of a well
73 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
74 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
75 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
76 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,245 (1911).
77 5 The Sacco-Vanzetti Case, 5516-5517 (1929).
78 Holmes, Natural Law in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 311 (1921).
79 Id. at 315.
80 Id. at 314.
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known book on jurisprudence, The Nature and Sources of the Law. As with
many of the writers we have examined, he made clear that law was one thing
and principles of morality another. Presumably for this reason he has been
called positivistic. For Gray, "The Law of the State or of any organized body
of men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is the judicial organs
of the body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties.
81
The great gain in its fundamental conceptions which Jurisprudence
made during the last century was the recognition of the truth that the
Law of a State or other organized body is not an ideal, but something
which actually exists. It is not that which is in accordance with religion,
or nature, or morality; it is not that which ought to be, but that which
is. To fix this definitely in the Jurisprudence of the Common Law, is
the feat that Austin accomplished. He may have been wrong in treat-
ing the Law of the State as being the command of the sovereign,
but he was right in teaching that the rules for conduct laid down by
the persons acting as judicial organs of the State, are the Law of the
State, and that no rules not so laid down are the Law of the State.8 2
A decision "is a Judicial Precedent, not because it ought to have been
made, but because it has been made. The decision of a court may unite the
character of a Judicial Precedent with the character of an expression of wise
thought or of sound morals, but often these characters are separated."8' 3
From these quotations it might be inferred that Gray freed law from
moral evaluation. But Gray made perfectly clear his belief to the contrary,
that law should conform to principles of morality.
It may be well to be reminded, by the resemblance between names
given to legal and moral relations that organized societies establish
many legal duties with a moral purpose, and that they ought not to
establish legal duties which are inconsistent with good morals; but it
is not well to affirm, simply on similarity in name, that the essence of
legal duties is a thing which they sometimes possess and sometimes do
not.84
In organized communities, political or other, the courts, in laying
down rules for the decision of cases, are hemmed in and limited in
many ways; the duty and responsibility of considering what rules they
ought to apply is largely taken away from them, and there is imposed
upon them, or they impose upon themselves, by reason of statutes,
precedents, professional opinion or custom, lines of conduct to be
followed without regard to their moral character; but where these
limitations have not been imposed, then it is safe to say that in all
civilized societies the courts are impliedly directed to decide in accord-
ance with the precepts of morality.8 5
He goes on to say that moral principles exert a great influence on the
way courts interpret statutes and select precedents s. 8 There is no doubt that for
Gray moral principles, principles of ethics are a main source of Law.
8 7
81 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 84 (2nd ed. 1924).
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HANS KELSEN
Hans Kelsen is the most famous living exponent of legal positivism. His
writings have been translated into French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian,
Czech, Polish, Serb, Hungarian, Greek, Bulgarian, Swedish, Japanese,
Chinese and English. He is famous for his "pure Theory of Law." Many
have been shocked by Kelsen's emphasis on the necessity of distilling all
concepts of justice and morality out of law to achieve a pure theory. They
contend that such a theory is better described as pure force rather than pure
law. They point to the following statements ,of Kelsen:
[The pure theory of law] does not try to comprehend the law as
an offspring of justice, as a human child of a divine parent. The pure
theory of law insists upon a clear distinction between empirical law
and transcendental justice by excluding the latter from its specific
concerns.... Only by separating the theory of law from a philosophy
of justice as well as from sociology is it possible to establish a specific
science of law.38
There can be no legal rights before there is law.8 9
... it is the ideal of juridical positivism to preserve the theory
of positive law from the influence of any political tendency, or which
amounts to the same from any subjective judgment of value.90
From these statements it is inferred that Kelsen's legal positivism is a
philosophy of law recognizing no moral limitations, a philosophy that what-
ever rights we have are given us by the state and that moral principles should
play no part in the development of legal rules.
But these inferences are a complete distortion of Kelsen's legal
positivism. He has expressly answered all of these distortions as we shall see
in a moment. First let us explain his pure theory of law so that his distillation
of all extraneous elements - justice, politics, religion, ethics, morals - can
be seen in its proper perspective.
Kelsen's pure theory of law is the format for the study of legal systems
in what he conceives to be a strictly scientific manner. With Austin and
Holmes, Kelsen condemns the sloppy use of moral terminology in the law.
But he stresses another reason for a pure scientific study of law. Kelsen
believes that "the splendid development of modem natural science may be
attributed largely to its emancipation from political powers, and especially
from the power of the Church."91 He strongly believes that until the social
sciences are studied as the natural sciences, for their own independent prin-
ciples, they will never be real sciences. It is for this reason primarily that
Kelsen emphasizes the separation of all value judgments from a pure theory
of law.
This approach can be compared to the purely scientific study of anatomy
or psychology. The attempt is to plumb the depths of the reality as it is, not
to prescribe how the human body or mind should function. So with the pure
theory of law, the purpose is to examine all legal systems and discern basic
88 KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE XV (1945).
89 Id. at '79.
90 KELSEN, Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism in GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
438 (1945).
91 KELSEN, Science and Politics in WHAT Is JusTIcs?, 357 (1957).
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common features in each. For example, Kelsen observes that all societies
from Ancient Babylon to the United States have employed "law." Any
society which might develop and not use "law" as a social order would in-
deed be a vastly different kind of human society. 92 In another place Kelsen
also observes that men obey the law for a variety of motives - religious,
social, moral fear of legal punishment. No scientific study has ever been done
to indicate precisely why people obey the law. 93 He suggests that this would
be extremely valuable information. It could be gained from an examination
of laws or legal systems regardless of how morally bad or good they are.
Kelsen anticipated that his position would be misunderstood. He said:
The tendency to identify law and justice is the tendency to justify
a given social order. It is a political, not a scientific tendency. In view
of this tendency, the effort to deal with law and justice as two different
problems falls under the suspicion of repudiating altogether the re-
quirement that positive law should be just. This requirement is self-
evident; but what it actually means is another question. At any rate a
pure theory of law in no way opposes the requirement for just law by
declaring itself incompetent to answer the question whether a given law
is just or not, and in what the essential element of justice consists. A
pure theory of law - a science - cannot answer this question because
this question cannot be answered scientifically at all. (Emphasis
mine.) 94
Kelsen, like Holmes, is a skeptic; that is, he rejects the ability of man's
reason to discern eternal and unchanging truths:
Thus, behind the question of Pilate, 'What is truth?' arises, out
of the blood of Christ, another still more important question, the
eternal question of mankind: What is Justice?
It seems that it is one of these questions to which the resigned
wisdom applies that man cannot find a definitive answer, but can only
try to improve the question.9 5
But he has his own standards by which he evaluates the moral goodness or
badness of positive law.
The question of justice, however, is the question of whether a
positive legal order ... is just, whether that which the lawmaker con-
siders as an evil to society is indeed a behavior against which society
should justly react, and whether the saction with which society
actually reacts!is appropriate. 96
There is no doubt that Kelsen's belief is that law is subject to moral
evaluation. Not only is the law subject to moral evaluation but he expressly
indicates that the state is subject to law.
The state as a legal person can be conceived of only as subjected
to the law like all other persons; and a relationship between legal per-
sons established by the law can be conceived of only as a legal obligation
or a legal right one person has in relationship to another. 97
In fact, he picks up and hurls back at the adherents of natural law the
very charges they make against legal positivism. He condemns absolutism
92 KELSEN, QENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 19-20 (1945).
93 Id. at 24.
94 Id. at 4.
95 KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 1 (1957).
96 Id. at 14.
97 KE.LSEN Science and Politics in WHAT Is JUSTICE? 371 (1957).
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and totalitarianism but goes on to say that these evaluations have sprung
more from adherents of natural law philosophers than philosophical skep-
ticism. 8 He argues that the "Absolutist" philosophical principles of Plato,
Aristotle, Aquinas, Dante, Leibniz and Hegel led these men to prefer
undemocratic states. Whereas the relativist philosophical positions of Pro-
tagoras, Euripides, Democritus, Nicholaus Cusanus and John Locke led
these men to support democracy.
Kelsen also attacks the tendency of natural law adherents to "legitimate
the product of power by declaring positive law to be just. It is precisely this
abuse of cognition which critical positivism wishes to avoid.""9 In other words,
Kelsen attacks natural law philosophers on the grounds that they proclaim
that whatever is, is right. This of course is a well-known criticism of legal
positivism. Kelsen seeks to hoist natural law with its own petard.
This review of the philosophical positions of the luminaries of the
jurisprudential school of legal positivism demonstrates the false nature of the
popular charges against it. There is no group of legal philosophers dedicated
to the proposition that might makes right and that law and the State should
be freed from presumed limitations of morality. The only person likely to
adhere to this absurd view is a non-thinking individual. We all have known
immoral persons who conduct their private or business affairs in a manner that
would suggest they have no morals and obey the law only because otherwise
they might get caught and be punished - Holmes' "bad man." Likewise there
are individuals who lead what Socrates called "the unexamined life" and who
never think about questions such as the relation of law and morality. They
act as if the letter of the law is its own justification. But neither of these are
dignified by classification as well-thought-out schools of legal philosophy.
No one has suggested they represent the legal positivism of Austin, Hobbes,
Bentham, Holmes, Gray and Kelsen.
This review also makes clear the obviously falsity of equating legal
positivism and totalitarianism. If we can agree that by totalitarianism we
mean the suppression of the rights and freedom of individuals in a misguided
desire to promote the welfare of the State, then it is obvious that these writers
oppose it. Kelsen, who knows modem totalitarianism well, has eloquently
condemned it and is clearly on record in favor of the protection of civil
liberties. Justice Holmes' judicial decisions in support of civil liberties are well
known. Austin and Hobbes were somewhat less enthusiastic about civil
liberties. They were more concerned with the danger of anarchy. And con-
sidering the historical period in which Hobbes lived, this was not an un-
reasonable fear. However neither Austin, Hobbes nor any of these writers
espoused doctrines or programs designed to promote Naziism, Fascism or
Bolshevism.100
98 KrLSFN, Absolutism and Relativism in WHAT Is JUsTnCE? 198, 204-205 (1957).
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At this point an important observation is in order. We have been dis-
cussing some false charges against positivism. However, it is important now
to state most emphatically that not all critics of positivism have made these
erroneous accusations. More perspicacious critics of positivism such as Morris
R. Cohen,1 1 Professor Lon Fuller, 102 Professor Edgar Bodenheimer, 1°3 and
F. Lyman Windolph, 04 in dealing with one or more of the so-called positivists,
have pointed out the fact that positivists do consider law and the State sub-
ject to independent moral evaluation. These critics take positivism to task
for much more subtle reasons. For example, Professor Lon Fuller criticises
positivism because it emphasizes what he considers insignificant, i.e., that
law and morality are different things, 10 5 and ignores what he considers most
important, i.e., the inherent moral character of law. This more understanding
criticism of legal positivism is not the straw man that I am dealing with in this
article.
POSSIBLE REASONS FOR POPULAR MISCONCEPTION
The next question is obvious. Why does such a false picture of legal
positivism exist? I have no definite answers but let us discuss a few possi-
bilities. First, it is possible that in some instances an intellectual "rush to the
summit" has taken place. That is, a reader has attempted to erect an entire
philosophy on the basis of an author's single phrase or sentence while
ignoring much else that the author has written. For example John Austin
said law is the command of the sovereign. On the basis of this general
proposition an entire superstructure of Austinian Positivism might be erected
as follows.
1. Apparently any command of the sovereign is, to Austin, law.
2. Some sovereigns have issued very bad proclamations but according
to Austin they would still be law.
3. From this it obviously follows that Austin makes no evaluation of
goodness or badness of laws.
4. Therefore, according to Austin, law is freed from moral evaluation,
the will of the sovereign is beyond limitation, might makes right.
As has been shown, a more complete reading of Austin would prevent this
"rush to the summit" with its attendant errors.
It is possible that the same thing has taken place with Holmes' oft-quoted
proposition that Law is the prediction of what the courts will do in fact. This
has been torn out of context and developed and generalized into an entire
legal philosophy far at variance with the context in which Holmes used the
concept.
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Possibly the very title of one of Hobbes' books, "Leviathan," has served
as the basis for another treacherous intellectual "rush to the summit." The
term - taken from the Book of Job and meaning Mortal God - when
applied to the State permits one's imagination to take flight and produce an
horrendous picture of tyranny, slavery and oppression at the hands of an all-
powerful, unlimited, autocratic, bureaucratic central government.
Kelsen warned us in advance that his separation of law and morals would
be misunderstood and it has been. Certainly a tendency to hasty generalization
may be one possible explanation for the popular misconception of legal
positivism.
In the same vein is the second possibility, that is, the equating of legal
positivism with philosophical positivism. Philosophical positivism or "soci-
ological" positivism is generally recognized as a school of thought in opposition
to the metaphysical abstractions of traditional philosophy. This positivism
condemns inquiries which claim to go beyond the facts and things of im-
mediate perception and experience. It emphasizes empirical rather than
metaphysical data. Auguste Comte has generally been recognized as one of
the leading exponents of this philosophy. In the popular mind it is pictured
as somewhat anti-religious and amoral. By the application of the widely
employed principle of "guilt by association" legal positivism may have in-
herited much of the popular prejudice associated with philosophical positiv-
ism. However, the relationship between the two is not a necessary one.
Austin and Hobbes, believers in natural law, could never be considered philo-
sophical positivists. Holmes and Kelsen, with their distrust of the power of
human reason to capture immutable truth concerning human values, are
closer to philosophical positivism. But from this it is obvious that a person
may be a legal positivist regardless of his general philosophy. The latter is
indifferent to legal positivism. This is clear if Austin - a believer in 'natural
law - and Holmes - definitely not a believer in natural law - are put in
the same camp.
A third possible explanation is one that suggests itself strongly to me.
There is a feeling among many lawyers, philosophers and theologians that
somehow the principles of right reason and good conscience can automatically
become principles of government. I say automatically because this view
disparages and distrusts the intervention of law-making by legislatures and,
to a somewhat less extent, distrusts law-making by judges. Partisans of this
view usually place great reliance on tradition and generally condemn change.
It is through adherence to tradition and the status quo apparently that govern-
ment automatically remains true to principles of right reason and good
conscience.
In this view active government is a real menace. To the extent that it
upsets existing expectations by changes, for example in the tax or racial
segregation laws, it derogates from rights guaranteed by nature. And judges
that refuse to invalidate such obvious injustices are conspirators in the erection
of a modern "Leviathan."
Legal positivism is blamed for this in the belief that it dwells on the
role of the human judge or legislator as the maker of positive law. The human
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judge or legislator is no longer told, as in Blackstone, that his task is to find
the law. The "petty politician" now is puffed up by being identified as a law
maker. And not only a law maker but a Sovereign law maker. Nay, even
more, a law maker not subject to the law. What an assault on our law, order
and way of life this positivism is!
That the writings of the legal positivists do not justify these views is
evident. It is clear there is no necessary relation between legal positivism and
an active or passive government. Bentham leaned toward the former whereas
Holmes was personally conservative.
A fourth possible explanation would clarify the position of some natural
law critics. Some of their comments suggest that a necessary result of any
legal system in which the principles of natural law are not superior to
positive law is that might makes right, state sovereignty becomes absolute,
law and morals are divorced and an individual has no natural rights. Accord-
ing to them the superiority of natural law over positive law means:
1. Positive law contrary to natural law is not law and, therefore, need
not, must not, be obeyed.
2. Courts should invalidate any positive enactment which is contrary
to natural law.
This they claim is the position of Aquinas and Blackstone and is pre-
sented as the orthodox and crucial test of a true and natural law position.
Since Austin and Hobbes, the latter less definitely, reject these, they are not
true natural lawyers. It is this natural law position that has been widely
critized for the past 100 years or more. Both Austin and Bentham demon-
strated that the practical result of this view was anarchy. It would allow every
citizen and individual judge to repudiate any enactment and decision he
thought to be immoral. When one realizes the wide spectrum of moral beliefs
that exist the unworkability of such a system is evident. For example, there
are pacifists today who conscientiously believe any involvement in military
preparedness is immoral. Should a pacifist judge have the power to declare
the draft law, the Defense Production Act and all other legislation relative
to military preparedness invalid on the grounds of immorality? Many believe
the graduated income tax to be a form of theft and therefore immoral. Should
citizens who so conscientiously believe be exempt from the obligation to pay
such income taxes? Should a judge who so believes have the power to declare
the income tax laws invalid? There are those who believe that the use of
medicine is immoral. Should parents who so believe be allowed to let their
children die because of inadequate medical care? Should a judge who so
believes have the power to invalidate public health and other like legislation?
This is not to say that conscientiously held beliefs should be steam-
rolled by the law. Not at all. On the contrary the problem of civil dis-
obedience is a real one and is so recognized by our law. For example, our
draft laws make exceptions for conscientious objectors. Some compulsory
immunization laws make exceptions for parents who are opposed to them.
Similarly, at Nuremberg the punishment of crimes against nature was a re-
cognition that the law does not excuse some flagrant violations of the moral
law done pursuant to superior authority. But this careful and selective way
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of dealing with the problem is vastly different from an approach which flatly
proclaims the right of individual citizens and judges to repudiate all laws
they fe'el are contrary to natural law. To the extent that natural law is said to
stand for this obviously untenable proposition, it has suffered irreparable, al-
though I hope, not mortal harm. Although there are passages in Aquinas'
Treatise on Law'0 6 which suggest that he took this broad position, it is diffi-
cult for me to believe that this is his true meaning. A more intelligent inter-
pretation, it seems to me, is one that limits his general statements that human
laws opposed to the divine and natural law are not to be obeyed in situations
involving obviously vicious laws. This would be similar to the approach of
the Nuremberg trials.
Conclusion
I think it is important to point out this popular misconception about legal
positivism for two reasons. First, these prevalent views are fundamentally
false. But the falsity is not only one of the misunderstanding of the views of
individual persons. It is a falsity in the fundamental approach to jurisprud-
ence. This article suggests the utter futility of categorizing or pigeon-holing
writers as belonging to various "schools of jurisprudence." The traditional
categorization of Hobbes and Austin as legal positivists makes no more sense
than categorizing Aquinas and Blackstone as positivists. Both Aquinas and
Blackstone distinguish natural law and positive law. Aquinas and Blackstone
mean by "human law" the same thing Austin calls positive law.10 7 But it
might be objected that natural lawyers like Aquinas and Blackstone cannot
rightly be categorized as legal positivists. If this is so then neither can Hobbes
and Austin, both adherents of natural law. And if we cannot rightly categorize
Austin as a legal positivist, we may as well abandon catgorization. Of course,
this is my point. Jurisprudential pigeon-holing by "schools" makes no sense
and should be abandoned.
Certain categorization, of course, does make sense. In the area of general
philosophy it is meaningful to lump together Holmes and Kelsen as Skeptics
and to lump together Bentham and Austin as Utilitarians. But to suggest
that this general philosophical approach has significant impact on their ap-
proach to particular legal questions or problems is a mistake. It is the legal
questions and legal problems - not the "schools of jurisprudence" - which
should be studied. And Austin as Austin, Kelsen as Kelsen and Holmes as
Holmes, and so on, have some significant things to say about these legal
questions and problems. But legal positivists as an amorphous group cannot
even be intelligently herded together to give us the positivist approach or
position on the important problems and questions.
For example, assuming arguendo the validity of lumping all these writers
together in a "school" of jurisprudence called legal positivism, what is their
position on the question of whether judges should be activist or passivist,
106 SuMmA THEOL. I-IH, Q. 90-97.
107 SummA THEOL. 1-Il Q. 91, Art 3; BLACESTONE'S Co mmENTrrmus, Sec. II. The Nature of Laws
in General.
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whether judges should or should not whole-heartedly accept their law-making
role? I select this question because it has been said that a positivist judge is
one who tends to be a passivist, would eschew law making, would seek to
find rather than make law.' Yet, as Professor Morison of the University of
Sidney has so recently indicated, 10 9 Austin not only recognized that judges
make law but criticized them for not doing so more whole-heartedly. 110
Holmes certainly recognized that judges make law."' Gray devoted a con-
siderable part of his book, The Nature and Sources of Law," 2 to the destruc-
tion of the view that judges find rather than make law. Kelsen clearly re-
cognizes that judges make law.11 3 The only conclusion that we can reach is
that if, as we are told, some positivists believe that judges should not make
law certainly all do not so hold.
Let us take another question. What is the so-called positivists' position
regarding the role of the law in the protection of civil liberties? Whereas
Austin was, to say the least, luke-warm in his concern for the legal protection
of civil liberties," 4 Holmes 1 5 and Kelsen 16 thought this one of the most
important functions of the law. What is the positivists' approach to proposals
having to do with world government? Austin 1 7 and Kelsen" 8 thought the
question worthy of serious consideration whereas Holmes was much more
skeptical. 119 Without belaboring the matter further, I think it can be said
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find any uniform, consistent approach
to legal questions and problems that can be attributed to a so-called positivist
"school." There is one possible exception. All of these writers agree on the
proposition that positive law is one thing and moral law is another. But since
everyone of intelligence, whether catalogued as a positivist or not, agrees with
this, it hardly makes sense to erect an entire school of jurisprudence on this
insignificant, non-distinguishing characteristic.
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Second, there is a very practical reason for pointing out this popular
misconception about legal positivism. I said that much energy is expended
slaying the positivist dragon. Not only is valuable time being wasted, but
more importantly, we are indulging in self-delusion. We are leading ourselves
to believe that we really have grasped something important about law when
we recognize the alleged errors of positivism. But the fact of the matter is
that we really haven't learned anything because we have been misled from
the paths of fruitful thought doing battle with a phantom enemy. The real
questions of law are not so simple to answer as that supposedly posed by the
straw man of positivism.
Every thoughtful person - including legal positivists - recognizes that
law is related to morality. Furthermore, for the most part there is agreement
on the basic human goals to strive for - realizing at all times we never shall
finally achieve them. I personally believe them to be inherent in the nature
of man. A list of such goals that appeals to me appears in Messner's Social
Ethics as follows:
1. Self-preservation, including bodily integrity and social respect (per-
sonal honor);
2. Self-perfection physically and spiritually, including the development
of one's faculties for the improvement of the conditions of one's life, and
provision for one's economic welfare, including the necessary property or
income to provide for the future;
3. The enlargement of one's experience, knowledge and receptivity of
the values of beauty;
4. Self-propagation by mating and the rearing of offspring;
5. Benevolent interest in the spiritual and material well-being of one's
fellow men as equal in their value as human persons;
6. Social fellowship to promote common utility, which consists in the
establishment of peace and order, in facilitating the achievement of the
material and cultural welfare of all, in the attainment of the knowledge
and control of the forces of nature and society for these purposes;
7. The knowledge and worship of the Creator, and the ultimate fulfill-
ment of one's self in union with Him. 12
The real, basic problems of the law concern the development of means
to promote the realization of these goals to the extent that law can do so.121
Law has something to say about all of them but more to say about some than
about others. From the very nature of the last having to do with religious
worship, it is obvious that the main contribution the law can make is along
the lines of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
providing for freedom of religion. In the case of others a more active con-
tribution can be made by law. To find and develop this contribution is a
significant and important legal problem.
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This has been the historic role of law. By promoting the realization of
these goals, law has made life for man more human and therefore more free.
Of course law cannot solve all human problems - far from it. But it can and
has made great contributions to human freedom as a rapid survey of American
legal history will indicate. In the first place the Founding Fathers abandoned
the weak, decentralized Articles of Confederation and established the stronger
central government of the United States under the Constitution. This positive
act in itself greatly contributed to the promotion of human freedom in the
United States by encouraging industry and commerce. Early congressional
customs and foreign trade regulations further encouraged economic health in
the United States. The governmental decisions of Westward expansion, the
construction of roads and other internal improvements, a benevolent public
lands policy, all expanded the choices available to early Americans. Govern-
ment subsidization and regulation of railroads and legal recognition of the
special status for business corporations all aided in the 19th century industrial
expansion.
Minimum wage and maximum hours legislation, safe labor conditions
legislation, workmen's compensation programs, conservation programs, public
health programs, regulations of banking, zoning and much of the New Deal
Legislation. The list is endless how law has historically contributed to the
promotion of human freedom.
No one suggests that all law has been wise, of course. In the early life of
our nation, Congress made the great mistake of enacting the repressive Alien
and Sedition laws. In the latter part of the 19th century state legislatures
made great "give-aways" to the railroads. The unnecessary oppression imposed
upon government employees by the Truman Loyalty Program is well-known.
These are just a few of our legal blunders. These errors dramatize the nature
of our real legal problem. It is to determine how law may make positive
contributions to the promotion of human freedom.
Human fredom is the faculty by which man chooses his destiny both
here and hereafter. But in the turbulence of anarchy or the straight-jacket of
poverty and ignorance the choices of man are greatly limited. To the extent
that law can and has promoted the realization of basic human goals, it has
expanded these choices and thus promoted true human freedom. But this
will not happen automatically. It will only happen if all who have to do with
law recognize their creative role and the responsibilities imposed by the role.
Inaction, rather than promoting freedom, is more likely to promote tyranny
and anarchy. For example, the anarchy of present international life imposes
vast limitations of choice on us all. International anarchy must be replaced
by international law in the cause of human freedom.
In our own country the problem of racial discrimination is not one that
will automatically solve itself as some apparently have thought. It will be
solved only by work and thought and assistance in part, but in an important
part, by law. When solved, the avenues of human choice open to persons of
all races will be greater than at present.
The same is true of our national educational problem, our mental
health problem, our physical health problem, the problems of poverty that are
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still with us, the problem of delays in the judicial and administrative process,
and the problems of mistakes in legislative and adjudicatory fact finding. Law
on the national, state, and local levels can make a contribution to the solution
of all these problems.
Then there are the more theoretical, but nonetheless real, problems of
the law: the nature of political authority, the relation of political authority to
law, the relation of the human person to his fellow men or, put another way,
the rights and obligations of the individual relative to the community, the
relationship of Church and State or religion and law, the nature of human
knowledge, the relationship of human knowledge to political authority, the
basis of political obedience, the purpose of human life and human society,
the translation of legal theory into legal practice, and many others.
These practical and theoretical problems are the real, the difficult legal
problems. Let us concentrate on them and not be diverted by fruitless battles
with the straw man of legal positivism.
